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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon § 78-2-2(3) (j), 
and § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
adopting clearly erroneous findings of fact that there was no 
credible evidence presented to the court that the plaintiff made 
payments to the defendant after 1965, thereby tolling the statute 
of limitations period in which Mr. Romero could enforce the 
Wardles' obligation. 
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court 
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly 
erroneous standard. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon 
v. Malner, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Grayson v. Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989), Western Capital and Security Inc. v. 
Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 
adopting incorrect conclusions of law that the defendant is 
barred by the statute of limitation contained in Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 78-12-1, 78-12-23, 70A-3-122, and that 
therefore the plaintiff is entitled to judgment and decree 
quieting title in the plaintiff. 
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. Bellon v. Malner, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); 
1 
Grayson v. Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989); Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) and Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989) ; 
Western Capital and Security Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989, 991 
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
§ 70A-3-122 Utah Code Ann, Accrual of cause of action. 
(1) A cause of action against a make or an acceptor accrues 
(a) in the case of a time instrument on the day after 
maturity; 
•(b) in the case of a demand instrument upon its date 
or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue. 
(2) A cause of action against the obligor of a demand or 
time certificate of deposit accrues upon demand, but demand on a 
time certificate may not be made until on or after the date of 
maturity. 
(3) A cause of action against a drawer of a draft or an 
indorser of any instrument accrues upon demand following dishonor 
of the instrument. Notice of dishonor is a demand. 
(4) Unless an instrument provides otherwise, interest runs 
at the rate provided by law for a judgment. 
(a) in the case of a maker, acceptor or other primary 
obligor of a demand instrument, from the date of demand; 
(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of the 
cause of action. 
2 
§ 78-12-1 Utah Code Ann, Time for commencement of actions 
generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute. 
§ 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. Within six years - Mesne profits 
of real property - Instrument in writing - Distributing of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
Within six years: 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in 
Section 78-12-22. 
(3) An action instituted under Section 78-12-12.5 regarding 
distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim. 
§ 78-12-44 Utah Code Ann. Effect of payment, 
acknowledgment, or promise to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment 
of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay 
the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within 
the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise 
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any 
3 
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This action was brought by Respondents ("Plaintiffs" or 
"Wardles") to quiet title to certain real property located in 
Davis County, Utah. In response, Appellant ("Defendant" or 
"Romero") counterclaimed to foreclose on the property. 
B. Course of Proceeding 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action in January, 
1994. Plaintiffs had difficulty in locating and serving 
defendant and as result, obtained an order allowing publication 
and service by mail. Shortly thereafter, default judgement 
against defendant and decree quieting title in plaintiffs was 
entered. Thereafter, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Second 
District Court Judge denied Defendant's Motion to set Aside 
Judgement and Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs. The Utah 
Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court's order denying 
defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and decree quieting 
title in the plaintiffs. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint and the defendant filed a counterclaim to foreclose on 
plaintiffs' property. 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page denied the plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgement on the basis that there were genuine issue 
4 
of material fact concerning whether the statute of limitations 
had run. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page 
sitting without a jury, on November 1, 1996. At the conclusion 
of trial, Judge Page ruled from the bench that plaintiffs' title 
in the subject property was quieted against the defendant and 
persons claiming under him. The order and decree was entered on 
December 10, 1996. 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. In March, 1960, the defendant, Lester Romero, and his 
then wife, Maxine Romero, negotiated with Glen D. Wardle and 
Thora Wardle for the sale of a house and lot situated in North 
Salt Lake, Utah at 320 East Center Street, more particularly 
described as follows: 
All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a 
subdivision of part of Sections 11 and 12, Township 1 
North Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. (subject 
property).1 
2. Thereafter, by Warranty Deed dated March 15, 1960, and 
recorded in the office of the Davis County recorder, Farmington, 
Utah on March 16, 1960, in Book 184 of official records at page 
115, Lester Romero and Maxine Romero conveyed the subject 
property to Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle as joint tenants.2 
1
 Findings, paragraph 1. 
2
 Findings, paragraph 2. 
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3. The Defendant recorded a Quit-Claim Deed dated March 1, 
I960, on May 24, 1993, wherein Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle 
are named as grantors and Lester Romero is named as grantee of 
the subject premises. Romero also recorded on May 24, 1993, a 
"Trust Deed" dated March 1, 1960, wherein the subject premises as 
securing a note in the sum of $6,000.00. Plaintiffs denied 
executing the Quit-claim Deed, the Trust Deed and the Promissory 
Note dated March 1, 1960. Plaintiffs claimed that the obligation 
due to Lester Romero and Maxine Romero as of March 1960 was 
$5,400.00 payable at the rate of $100.00 per month.3 
4. Romero claims he received a promissory note for 
$6,000.00, secured by a deed of trust on the Property. He also 
received a signed quitclaim deed conveying the Property back to 
him, which he could record if Plaintiffs did not pay as 
promised.4 
5. The Wardles claimed that they executed a mortgage in 
favor of defendant for $5,400.00 to secure payment of the 
obligation.5 
6. The Mortgage relied upon by the plaintiffs is an 
unsigned "conformed copy" and not the original.6 
3
 Findings, paragraph 3. 
4
 Rt. 126-30. 
5
 Rt. 13-14. 
6
 Rt. 31-32. 
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7. During the next several years the Wardles were rarely 
prompt in paying their obligations as required by the promissory 
note .7 
8. It is undisputed that the Wardles made payments on the 
obligation up until at least 1965.8 
9. The Wardles claim that no payments were made after 
1965.9 
10. Romero never allowed more than three (3) years to 
elapse without collecting a payment.10 
11. Romero claims that the Promissory Note remained 
constantly delinquent.11 
12. On May 24, 1993, Mr. Romero, being unable to convince 
Plaintiffs of their remaining obligation, recorded the quitclaim 
deed.12 
13. The plaintiffs' obligation to defendant was 
acknowledged in writing by the plaintiffs in 1980.13 
Rt. 131-134, 152-156. 
Findings, paragraph 4. 
Rt. 12. 
Rt. 131-34, 152-56. 
Rt. 131-34, 152-56. 
Findings, paragraph 3. 
Findings, paragraph 6. 
7 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14. Defendant met with the plaintiffs in 1980 to discuss 
payment of the remaining amount due on the Note.14 
15. Plaintiffs, as a result of that meeting, mailed 
defendant a check for the $5,173.40 they claimed was the 
remaining amount due on the Note and asked for a full release of 
defendant's lien on the Property. 
16. Romero returned the check to the plaintiffs because it 
was less than the total amount then owing. However, Romero 
continued receiving payments up until 1991.15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Romero appeals on the basis that the evidence at trial 
did not support the trial court's findings that no payments were 
made by the Wardles or received by Mr. Romero after 1965, and as 
a result the statute of limitations had run on Mr. Romero's right 
to enforce the Wardles' obligation. It is the position of Romero 
that the great weight of evidence clearly showed that payments 
were in fact received from the Wardles on the obligation, which 
tolled the statute of limitations and it was reversible error for 
the lower court to rule otherwise. 
Rt. 33-35. 
Rt. 131-34, 152-56. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND 
THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
POINT I 
The Trial Court's Finding That There Were no Payments Made By 
Plaintiffs After 1965 is Against the Great Weight of Evidence 
Presented at Trial. 
The trial court entered a single finding, Finding No. 4, 
regarding the credibility of evidence of payment of the 
obligation by the Wardles to Romero.16 The trial court simply 
found that because of the conflicting testimony regarding payment 
of the obligation after 1965, Romero said he received several 
payments, Mrs. Wardle said no payments were made, that the only 
possible evidence before the court was the payment schedule 
maintained by Romero which was received as part of plaintiff's 
Exhibit 18, and as a result, the credibility of that payment 
schedule would be determinative.17 
After comparing plaintiff's Exhibit 18 with the checks and 
receipts maintained by plaintiff and entered and received as 
defendant's Exhibit 12, the trial court found that because of the 
inconsistencies between the two sets of documents, that Romero's 
payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was therefore not 
Findings, paragraph 4. 
Id. 
9 
worthy of any credibility as far as the court was concerned.18 
This finding by the trial court, was based entirely on the 
(1 l 
assumption that the plaintiff^s checks and receipts as set forth 
in defendant's Exhibit 12 was the undisputable and established 
starting point from which to determine the credibility of 
Romero's payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18). As set forth 
below, such an assumption was unreasonable under the 
circumstances and not supported by the evidence. 
Romero challenges both Finding No. 4 and the resulting 
Conclusions of Law. Romero acknowledges that the trial court's 
findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous19, 
however, the conclusions of law are not entitled to the same 
level of deference; a correction of error standard applies to 
conclusions of law.20 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if 
it is against the great weight of evidence or if the reviewing 
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake 
has been made.21 "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the 
appellant can show that they are without adequate evidentiary 
foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view of the 
18
 Id. 
19
 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a) . 
20
 Gravson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989) . 
21
 Bountiful v. Rilev 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) citing 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
10 
law."22 A finding is deemed clearly erroneous if this Court 
concludes that it is against the clear weight of the evidence.23 
The standard of review of findings of fact is governed by 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rationale 
of the Rule is revealed by its language: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
A. The Evidence Fails to Support Finding Number 4 
Regarding Credible Evidence of Payments by Plaintiffs 
after 1965, 
To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, Romero 
must marshall all the evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
it even when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court.24 In this section, therefore, Romero will review 
all of the evidence of which he is aware that supports finding 
No. 4 and will in this and subsequent sections demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient. 
22
 Western Capital and Security Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 
989, 991 (Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989) 
citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
23
 Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-
900 (Utah 1989) . 
24
 Id. at 899. 
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1. Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence at trial 
to dispute defendant's claim that payments were 
made on the plaintiff's obligation which tolled 
the statute of limitations. 
As set forth in the trial court's findings, the critical 
issue before the court was when and if, Romero received payments 
from the Wardles on the obligation after 1965, thereby tolling 
the applicable statute of limitations period.25 As a result, 
and as revealed in the trial court's analysis, the issue of 
whether payments were made by the Wardles after 1965, would be 
resolved by determining the credibility of the payment schedule 
maintained by Romero and received as plaintiff's Exhibit 18.26 
The evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the 
Wardles made no payments on the obligation after 1965 and 
therefore the payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was not 
credible consists solely of the testimony Mrs. Wardle and her 
daughter Maxine Romero. 
Taking chronologically the testimony of these two witness 
most supportive of Finding No. 4, there is simply insufficient 
evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that no payments 
were received on the obligation after 1965. 
First, on direct examination, Mrs. Wardle testified that the 
obligation owing to Romero was actually Five Thousand Four 
Hundred Dollars ($5,400.00) and was secured by an unrecorded 
25
 Findings, paragraph 4. 
26
 Id. 
12 
mortgage executed in favor of the Romeros, rather than a Six 
Thousand Dollar ($6,000.00) obligation secured by a trust deed as 
claimed by Romero. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "311).27 Mrs. Wardle 
also testified that the Promissory Note, Trust Deed and Quit 
Claim Deed executed in favor of Romero (Plaintiff's Exhibits " 
11", "15" and "16") were not related to the transaction giving 
rise to the obligation as claimed by Romero.28 Furthermore, on 
direct examination, Mrs. Wardle adamantly denied that neither she 
nor Mr. Wardle ever signed the documents which form the basis of 
Romero's claim for foreclosure and identified herein as 
plaintiff's Exhibits "11", "15", and "IS".29 
Further, with respect to the obligation owing to Romero, 
Mrs. Wardle testified that the last payment made on the 
obligation to either Lester or Maxine Romero was in 1965.30 To 
further support this claim, Mrs. Wardle also testified she 
handled the Wardle family finances exclusively, that she wrote 
all the checks from the family checking account, and that she did 
not recall Mr. Wardle ever making any payments on the 
obligation.31 Mrs. Wardle testified that she was the only 
27
 Rt. pp 14-15. 
28
 Rt. 20-26. 
29
 Rt. 21-26. 
30
 Rt. 27. 
31
 Rt. 27-28. 
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person who did, and could have made payments on the obligation to 
Romero.32 
On cross examination, Mrs. Wardle reiterated that she was 
the only person who made payments on the obligation to Romero33 
and also that Mr. Wardle never wrote a check or withdrew money 
from the Wardles' checking and savings accounts while they were 
married.34 Mrs. Wardle also again stated that she did not sign 
the Promissory Note as asserted by Romero.35 
With respect to Romero's payment schedule (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 18), Romero did in fact, admit under examination by Mr. 
Fadel, that the entry for the 1991 payment was mistakenly 
recorded as being received in 1992.36 
Maxine Romero corroborated Mrs. Wardle's testimony and also 
testified that the amount of the obligation in question was 
actually $5,400.00 rather than the $6,000.00 as claimed by Mr. 
Romero37 and also that the mortgage (plaintiff's Exhibit 3) 
executed in favor of the Romeros was the controlling document 
given on the subject property38. On cross examination, Mrs. 
32
 Rt. 27-29. 
33
 Rt. 38. 
34
 Rt. 44-45. 
35
 Rt. 47. 
36
 Rt. 90-91. 
37
 Rt. 99-102. 
38
 Rt. 101. 
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Romero testified that she received no payments or offers of 
payment from the Wardles after 1980.39 
It is clear from the marshalling of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's Finding No. 4 that the court found that the 
testimony of Mrs. Wardle and Maxine Romero were more credible 
than the testimony of Mr. Romero and that as result, there was 
simply no credible evidence of payment which would have tolled 
the statute of limitations. However, that finding is clearly 
erroneous because it is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
2. Overwhelming evidence was presented at trial to 
demonstrate by a clear preponderance that at no 
time did a period of more than six years elapse 
between payments by the plaintiffs on their 
obligation to defendant, thereby tolling the 
statute of limitations. 
Finding No. 4 completely overlooks the weighty testimony of 
Mr. Romero as well as the inconsistent and unreliable testimony 
of Mrs. Wardle, referred to herein. The finding also overlooks 
the obvious bias and unreliable testimony of Maxine Romero on 
issues which she conceded she was not familiar. The clear weight 
of all the evidence is that at no time did a period of more than 
six years elapse between payments by the Wardles on their 
obligation to Romero, thereby tolling the statute of limitations 
pursuant to § 78-12-44, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
Rt. 111. 
15 
a. The Testimony of Mrs. Wardle was not 
Credible. 
The weight of evidence cannot be disregarded on the basis 
that the court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and 
simply chose to ignore the obligation still owing and also 
decided to disregard the testimony of Mr. Romero. The evidence 
disregarded by the trial court consists not only of testimony of 
Mr. Romero, but also the testimony by Mrs. Wardle that she simply 
could not recall with clarity, the critical details of the 
transaction at issue. 
First of all, Mrs. Wardle has taken the position that the 
obligation owing to Mr. Romero has been fully satisfied.40 This 
position is simply unreasonable, particularly in light of Mrs. 
Wardle's direct testimony that in 1980 and after acknowledging 
the obligation to Romero, she and Mr. Wardle used money 
originally offered to Romero as satisfaction to purchase an 
automobile.41 Such a position is untenable and clearly 
demonstrates a lack of understanding and ability to recall the 
important details of the parties' transaction. 
Of great significance is Mrs. Wardles testimony regarding 
the checks and receipts contained in defendant's Exhibit 12, 
which the trial court used as the starting point in determining 
Rt. 33. 
Rt. 33-34 
16 
the credibility of payments received after 1965.42 After the 
parties stipulated that defendant's Exhibit 12 contained copies 
of all the receipts received and canceled checks written by Mrs. 
Wardle to Romero concerning the obligation,43 Mrs. Wardle 
testified to the best of her recollection that she paid Mr. 
Romero on the obligation approximately ninety percent (90%) of 
the time, by check.44 However, defendant's Exhibit 12 which 
contains proof of at least 2 9 payments, contains only 3 canceled 
checks. Obviously, either the payment and receipts and canceled 
checks set forth in defendant's Exhibit 12 are inaccurate or Mrs. 
Wardle's testimony is incorrect in stating that she made payments 
by check approximately ninety percent (90%) of the time. Despite 
such glaring inconsistencies, the trial court found both 
defendant's Exhibit 12 and Mrs. Wardle's testimony persuasive. 
Further, the trial court also apparently accepted Mrs. 
Wardle's testimony that Mr. Wardle never wrote a check or made a 
withdrawal from the family savings account while the parties were 
married,45 and that it was not possible that Mr. Wardle could 
have made the payments to Romero which are in dispute.46 Such 
42
 Findings, Paragraph No. 4. 
43
 Rt. 40. 
44
 Rt. 39. 
45
 Rt. 44-45. 
46
 Rt. 117-118. 
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testimony although unreasonable on its face, was fully accepted 
and relied upon by the trial court in reaching its decision. 
Finally, it was clear from the record that Mrs. Wardle's 
testimony that her recollection was inconsistent and unreliable 
at best. For instance, with respect to the Trust Deed 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16), initially, Mrs. Wardle denied ever 
signing the document.47 However in her deposition she 
previously testified that she did in fact sign the Trust Deed 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16),48 After reviewing her deposition, 
Mrs. Wardle went on to reaffirm that she did in fact sign the 
Trust Deed.49 However, on redirect by Mr. Fadel, Mr. Fadel 
introduced an additional portion of the deposition in which Mrs. 
Wardle stated that she simply could not recall whether or not she 
signed the documents.50 On recross examination, Mrs. Wardle 
then testified that she simply could not recall "which documents 
she signed in I960."51 It is abundantly clear that as a result 
of the foregoing, the testimony of Mrs. Wardle is simply 
unreliable and was an inadequate and insufficient basis for the 
trial court to base its Findings and Conclusions. 
47
 Rt. 47. 
48
 Rt. 50. 
49
 Rt. 52-53. 
50
 Rt. 52-55. 
51
 Rt. 55. 
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b. The Testimony of Maxine Romero was not 
Credible. 
It is clear from the Record that Maxine Romero's testimony 
was not persuasive in determining whether defendant's Exhibit 12 
was credible. For example, in her sworn testimony Maxine Romero 
admitted to signing Mr. Romero's name on receipts for payments 
received from the Wardles which were contained in defendant's 
Exhibit 1252. Such testimony would easily explain the 
discrepancies between plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and defendant's 
Exhibit 12, the basis upon which the trial court found the 
payment schedule not to be credible. However, such critical 
evidence was simply ignored by the Court. 
c. The Testimony of Lester Romero was the Only 
Credible Evidence Before the Trial Court. 
Given the unreliability of the testimony of Mrs. Wardle and 
Maxine Romero, the trial court should have based its findings on 
the more reliable testimony of Mr. Romero which clearly 
established that at no time did a period of more than six years 
elapse between payments by the plaintiffs on their obligation to 
defendant, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. Such a 
result is not only required under the law, but is also required 
as a matter of fairness. Simply put, Mr. Romero should not lose 
his right to collect on the obligation simply because he extended 
the Wardles considerable generosity in repaying their obligation. 
Rt. 109. 
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At trial, Romero clearly established that the Wardles had an 
obligation and that it has not been satisfied. The agreement 
between the parties was reflected in the Promissory Note, Trust 
Deed and Quit Claim Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibits 11, 15 and 16).53 
In addition, the repayment history was reflected and established 
by Romero's payment schedule (Defendant's Exhibit 4, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 12) .54 In addition to the payment schedule, Romero 
offered further proof in his testimony which indicated the he 
received payments from the Wardles in 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 
1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 
1991,55 as well as an additional payment in 1988 (Exhibit 8) .56 
3. The Evidence Clearly Established The Statute of 
Limitations was Tolled by Payments after 1965. 
The law is well settled that an action based upon a written 
contract must be commenced within six years after the cause of 
action has accrued.57 Thus defendant's cause of action had to 
be initiated on or before 1971 (six years after the date of 
undisputed last performance in 1965), unless the Wardles engaged 
in some type of conduct which extended the statutory period. 
Rt. 126-30. 
Rt. 130-31. 
Rt. 131-33. 
Rt. 133-34, 152-53, 156. 
See § 78-12-1, § 78-12-23, § 70A-3-122 Utah Code Ann. 
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53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
However, under § 78-12-44, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
if Romero received payments of any part of the principle or 
interest due under the contract, then the statute of limitations 
runs anew from the date of receipt of the latest payment in 1991. 
Section 78-12-44, reads as follows: 
11
 78-12-44. Effect of payment, 
acknowledgment, or promise to pay. In any 
case founded on contract, when any part of 
the principal or interest shall have been 
paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to 
pay the same, shall have been made, an action 
may be brought within the period prescribed 
for the same after such payment, acknowledged 
or promise." 
As a result of the foregoing, the statute of limitations 
does not bar Romero's counterclaim. As set forth herein, the 
defendant's unequivocal testimony and supporting documents 
produced at trial clearly established that at no time did a 
period of more than six or more years elapse between payments by 
the Wardles on their obligation. Appellant submits that the 
pertinent evidence in the present case so clearly preponderates 
against the trial Court's findings as to defeat any presumption 
in the trial Court's favor, and the result reached below should 
therefore be reversed. 
It is well established that the Appellate Court may review 
the evidence in equity cases such as the present one, and that if 
such evidence preponderates against the lower Court's decision, 
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it will be reversed.58 In fact, in the case of Richards v. 
Pines Ranch, Inc.59 an action to establish a right-of-way by 
prescription, the Court again found that it was not bound to 
follow findings of the trial Court in an equity case where the 
findings appeared to be contrary to the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing substantial and persuasive reasons, 
Appellant Romero respectfully submits this Appellant's Brief for 
the Court's consideration and determination, and requests that 
the lower court's ruling quieting title in the subject property 
be reversed in order to allow appellant to proceed with 
foreclosing on the property or otherwise enforcing the Wardles' 
obligation. rjT 
DATED this day of May, 1997. 
APPEL & WARLAUMONT, L.CL 
Janjiels R. Wilson 
^ "Jttorney for Appellant 
58
 Barker v. Dunham. 342 P. 2d 867 (Utah 1959). 
59
 559 P.2d 948 (Utah, 1977). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the &)' day of May, 1997, I caused 
copies of BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT to be hand-delivered 
George Fadel 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
170 East Fourth South 
B o u n t i f u l , UT 84 01J2L. ^^ 
S 
( 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Dtt/fl 8 11 AM 'SG 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OP UTAH 
GLEN D- WARDLE and 
THORA WARDLE, 
Flaintif£s, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMEROf 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 940700002 QT 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled court 
on November 1, 1996f the Honorable Rodney S. Pagef District Judge, 
presiding without a jury; Plaintiff, Thora Wardle, as surviving 
joint tenant of Glen D. Wardle appeared in person and by attorney 
George K. Fadel; Defendant/ Lester Romero appeared in person and 
by attorney James R. Wilson; the court received the testimony, 
evidence and arguments of the parties, and beiuq fully advised in 
the matter, now makes the followinq: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Some time in March, 1960, the defendant, Lester Romero, 
and his then wife, Maxine Romero, negotiated with Glen D. Wardle 
and Thora Wardle for the sale of a house and lot situated in North 
Salt Laker Utah at 320 East Center Street, more particularly 
described as follows: 
1 
George K. Fadel #1027 
Attorney for Plaintiff* 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
295-2421 
All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a 
subdivision of part of Sections 11 and 12, 
Township 1 Morth Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, (subject premises). 
2. Thereafter, by Warranty Deed dated March 15, 1960, and 
recorded in the office of the Davis County recorder, Farmington, 
Utah on March 16, i960, in Book 184 of official records at pagp 
115, Lester Romero and Maxine Romero conveyed the subject prp.ini RPS 
to Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle as joint tenant*. 
3. The Defendant recorded a Quit-Claim Deed dated March 1, 
I960, on May 24, 1993, wherftin G1«n D* Wardle and Thora Wardle are 
named as grantors and T.pat«»r Romero is named as grantee of the 
subject premises. Primaro also recorded on May 24, 1993, a "Trust 
Deed" dated Marnh 1, I960, wherein the subject premiccc ac accuring 
a note in thp «nm of $6,000.00, Plaintiff© denied executing the 
Quit-claim fippd, th* Trust Deed and the promiccory note dated March 
1, 1960. Plaintiffs claimed that the obligation due to Lester 
Romp.rn and Maxine Romero as of March 1960 was $5,400.00 payable at 
thp rate of $100.00 per month./ Accuming that the Quit-claim Deed, 
the Note and the Trust Dcod were in fact executed and delivered by 
the plaintiff© to the defendant, these were unly as aeuuriLy and 
not intended as a conveyance, and iL ia ixuL necessary for the court 
to determine the validity u£ the said documents for the reason that 
the bar of the statule ol limitations precludes and recovery by the 
defendant upon any obligation claimed by the defendant. 
4. The evidence is uncontruvea Led Lhat the payments were made 
eomewhat sporadically up unLil 1965, the last payment was $50.00 
in 1965. Prom that puiuL on, the evidence is in conflict as to 
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whether or not any payments were made. The defendant indicates 
that they weref and the plaintiff indicates that they were not. 
There's no evidence in the form of checks or receipts which were in 
existence prior to that time to support the position of either of 
the parties in that regard* The only possible evidence that we 
have is the payment schedule maintained by the defendant which was 
received as part of plaintiff's Exhibit 18f and so there is need to 
look at the credibility of that payment schedule that he kept in 
his own handwriting or someone's handwriting• It's interesting to 
note from the defendant's Exhibit 12r which is the receipts and 
checks paid by the plaintiff, that Mr. Romero's statement shows 
four payments were made in 1960. However, the receipts show that 
there were at least five or six payments made in that year. 
Therefore, in fact, his record is incorrect in that regard. There 
were eleven payments made in 1961 and they matched the receipts and 
checks that were in defendant's Exhibit 12. 
In 1962, the record of Mr. Romero shows that there were five 
payments made. Howeverf the receipts and cancelled checks show 
there were actually eight. Again, his record is inaccurate., 1963 
shows six payments were made and that appears to be accurate, and 
then the two payments were made in 1965. From then on, all 
subsequent entries made from time to time, about every other year 
or every three years by the defendants showing $100.00 payments. 
It's interesting to note that from his own testimony the payment 
that he claims in 1980 is not shown on that record. From his own 
testimony, he recognizes that the payment shown in 1992 was 
incorrect. He claims it was actually made in 1991. 
From those discrepancies, the court finds that this payment 
record is not worthy of any credibility as far as the court is 
concerned, and with that finding, the court finds that there is no 
credible evidence before the court which this court believes that 
shows any payments that were made after June of 1965. 
The court finds that these plaintiffs were in default at least 
beginning in 1962 and each year thereafter and certainly any 
payments after those acknowledged by both of the parties in 1965. 
The court recognizes, as do counsel, that there is a six year 
statute of limitations in this matter and that this statute of 
limitations would have run on this matter in 1971. 
5. The court finds that there was no effort by this defendant 
to collect in any way on this particular obligation until 1985 when 
a Lis Pendens was filed. The law is clear that in order for a Lis 
Pendens to be effective it must be filed at the time the action is 
filed or shortly thereafter, and there was never any action filed, 
so the Lis Pendens in fact was void. Now, that may well be the 
fault of counsel, but it is not the fault of these plaintiffs and 
in no way can be considered by the court that is in any way 
prejudicing any rights that they might have. 
6. The court recognizes that there is a statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-44, which would allow contract obligations to be 
revived. It provides that if there is a written statement 
specifically acknowledging that obligation by the parties sought to 
be charged, then the obligation can be revived and the statutory 
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period would run from that date. However, that is qualified. That 
revival must take place within the statutory period. Here there is 
no evidence to support any kind of action that would support a 
revival after 1980f and the letter that was sent by the Wardles at 
that time to Mr. Romero was long after the statute of limitations 
had run. The court therefore finds that the statute of limitations 
had run on the note which was the basis of the obligation claimed 
by the defendant? that the claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations; and that any quit-claim deed which arose out of that 
is void and must be set aside and that any trust deed or note which 
might have been recorded in 1993 is also void. The court therefore 
finds that plaintiffs are entitled to have a decree quieting title 
to this property in the plaintiffs. 
7- The plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint alleges a cause of 
action for slander of title under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-4 and claim entitlement to 
treble actual damages and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
The court finds that in order for the court to ward such a 
remedy in this matter, the court must find that the defendant knew 
or had reason to know that the documents were groundless or 
provided no basis for the filing of those things. The court would 
find that Mr. Romero was untrained in the law and that he did not 
know or have reason to know that they were invalid under the 
circumstances and therefore denies any remedy under the statute 
pertaining to slander of title. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
5 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The counterclaim of the defendant is barred by the statute 
ot limitations contained in Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-12-1, 
78-12-23r 70A-3-118, and 70A-3-122, and the plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment of dismissal with prejudice of the defendant's 
counterclaim. 
2- The Quit-claim Deed and Trust Deed dated March 1, I960, 
and recorded by the defendant on May 24, 1993 are void and should 
be set aside and declared to have given defendant no interest in 
the subject premises. 
3. The Defendant has no right, title, interest or claim to 
the Subject Premises nor any claim against the Plaintiffs with 
respect thereto. 
4. Plaintiff, Thora Wardle as surviving joint tenant of Glen 
D. Wardle, is entitled to judgment and decree quieting tile to the 
Subject Premises in Thora Wardle against the Defendant and all 
persons claiming by through or under the Defendant, and permanently 
enjoining the Defendant and all persons claiming under him from 
asserting any estate, right, title, possession, lien or interest in 
the Subject Premises adverse to the said Plaintiff. 
Dated this V ^ day of jtmrgmfrer, 1996. 
BY THE COURT * s~\ 
Dis tr i c t cjjidge 
ADDENDUM "B" 
P W •'re- » . , " ' 
DECW 8 u / i r 9 £ 
0URK
*W mi. COURT 
Fy 
IN THE SECOND DTSTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
 f 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D- WARDLE and ) 
THORA WARm,Er 
) JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Plaintiffs, QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS 
vs. 
) Civil No. 940700002 QT 
LESTER ROMERO, 
) Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant:. 
This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled court 
on November 1, 1996, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge, 
presiding without a jury; Plaintiff, Thora Wardle, as surviving 
joint tenant of Glen D- Wardle appeared in person and by attorney 
George K. Fadel; Defendant, Lester Romero appeared in person and 
by attorney James R. Wilson? the court received the testimony, 
evidence and arguments of the parties, and the Court having 
heretofore made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Plaintiff Thora Wardle is the owner absolutely in fee 
simple and is in sole, exclusive possession of the premises at 320 
East Center Street, North Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah, 
more particularly described as: 
:;.j Ljvn^ncu 
George K. Fadel #1027 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
295-2421 
All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a subdivision 
of part of Stations 11 and 12
 f Township 1 North Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
2. Plaintiff, Thora Wardle's title is quieted against the 
Defendant and all persons claiming under him, and said Plaintiff is 
granted quiet and peaceful possession of said premises as against 
the Defendant and all persons claiming under the Defendant, and the 
Defendant and all persons claiming by, through or under him have no 
estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or 
any part thereof. 
3. IT IS FURTHER DECREED that the Defendant and all other 
persons claiming under him are permanently enjoined from asserting 
any estate, right title, possession, lien or interest in or to said 
premises adverse to the Plaintiff or in any way interfering with 
Plaintiffs full use and enjoyment of said property or asserting 
any claim against Plaintiff in relation thereto. 
4. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice• 
5. The Plaintiff's claim for damages for slander of title is 
dismissed with prejudice, 
6. Plaintiff is awarded^costs herein. 
Dated this ^ day of November> 1996. 
BY THE COURT _ 
!gy3 Distriqy Judge 
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